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朝鲜第三次核试验是主体经济体系的胜利

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发表于 2013-2-12 19:45:42 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
要完成地下核试验这样的工作,需要相当先进的科技和相当实力的经济基础。

在90年代以来,经历了全球最严密的封锁和围困,朝鲜主体经济体系仍然能够做到三次地下核试验,充分地展示了自己的顽强生命力。

以本国资源和本国技术为后盾的经济体系,才是真正最牢固的经济。

让朝鲜第三次核试验成为蒙古人之中的那些有识之士的新年爆竹,来欢呼主体经济体系的胜利吧!
 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-12 19:48:29 | 显示全部楼层
要原子弹,也要香料

http://www.rodong.rep.kp/InterCn/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2013-02-09-0018&chAction=T

我们的风度、我们的香气




在大同江畔拔地而起的平壤香料厂,是综合而现代化的配香料生产基地。
我们的香料工业拿什么为人民生活作贡献呢?
拿香气这一句话不能充分形容出广而深的香气世界,却从中能够充分感受到。
“生产配香料的基础原料是没加进多种香料的单一香料。世界上用于生产配香料的单一香料达几百种。”
这是这个厂的干部说的话。
在我们眼前展现出各种单一香料搅拌成新的香料的过程。
黄油、草莓、苹果、桃、牛奶香料…
作曲家们只拿几种音符能创造出无限的音乐作品。
那么,达几百种的单一香料怎样从几种香料互相结合成几十种的时候产生的香料,到底有多少呢?
据他们说,拿同样的香料也根据怎样规定配合比率,其香气也有所变,质量也有显著差别。
我们通过参观香水生产室,更深地感到了香料工业的这种很高的技术要求和发展侧面。
室内香水、人身用香水、车内香水…
形式既然多样,而其香气又新鲜、柔和。
像葱茏树林里吸足清新的空气或闻足树香味儿、草根香味儿那样的爽快感,从中隐隐喷出的花香味儿…令人陶醉。
新品种开发室、产品分析室、调香室,活像无数看不见的旋律充溢的创作室。
目前,这家工厂生产的我们的各种香料,大量用于很多工厂的饮料、糖果、化妆品的生产。
我们的香气、我们的风度,随着我们高水平的产品的增加和品种的扩大,利用它的人民的心里也产生无比的民族荣誉感和自豪感。

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 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-12 19:50:30 | 显示全部楼层
特色集团再现修正主义嘴脸

中国外交部召见朝鲜驻华大使
2013-02-12 18:51:52 来源: 外交部网站

2月12日,外交部长杨洁篪召见朝鲜驻华大使池在龙,就朝鲜进行第三次核试验提出严正交涉。

杨洁篪表示,中国政府对朝方不顾国际社会普遍反对,再次进行核试,表示强烈不满和坚决反对。

杨洁篪强调,中方一贯主张半岛无核化,维护半岛和平稳定,支持在六方会谈框架下通过对话协商均衡地解决各方关切。

杨洁篪要求朝方停止采取进一步激化局势的言行,尽快回到对话协商的正确轨道。
 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-12 19:51:22 | 显示全部楼层
帝国主义势力惊惶失措

英国外交部长黑格强烈谴责朝鲜核试验
2013-02-12 14:15:34 来源: 央视

据朝中社消息,朝鲜刚刚宣布成功进行核试验。目前,韩国军方正式进入应对朝鲜核试验的紧急状态。日本首相称将对朝鲜实施单独制裁。英国外交部长黑格强烈谴责朝鲜核试验。安理会将召开紧急会议讨论朝鲜核试问题。
 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-12 19:52:15 | 显示全部楼层
俄国还是应该多关心关心波罗的海三国的北约军事基地以及东欧的美国反导系统

俄罗斯对朝鲜核试验表示“明确谴责”
2013-02-12 14:16:56 来源: 网易

路透社援引国际文传电讯社消息,俄罗斯对朝鲜核试验表示“明确谴责”。
 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-12 19:58:04 | 显示全部楼层


朝鲜男主播激昂播报核试验: 核试验成功
 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-12 20:02:48 | 显示全部楼层
朝鲜外务省发言人:美国应二中择一

    朝中社平壤2月12日电 朝鲜外务省发言人12日发表谈话。谈话如下:
    我们的第三次核试验是对付美国对朝敌对措施的坚决的自卫措施。
    我们于去年12月成功发射“光明星3号”人造地球卫星,地地道道是根据旨在建设经济和改善人民生活的科学技术发展计划进行的和平事业。
    包括敌对国家在内的全世界承认我们的实用卫星成功进入轨道,对我们的航天技术发展面貌惊叹不已。
    但是,美国声称朝鲜发射卫星有悖于联合国安理会“决议”,怂恿安理会又炮制了新的“制裁决议”。
    对卫星发射权利的侵犯,就是对朝鲜主权的侵犯,是绝不可容许的严重敌对行为。
    我们本来没有必要,也没有计划非要进行核试验。
    我们的核遏制力早已充分具备了可靠的能力,不管在地球任何角落也能够进行精密打击、一举消灭侵略的本营。
    依靠伟大的大元帅们献出一生缔造的自卫核遏制力,集中力量建设经济和改善人民生活,这是我们原来的目标。
    在美国于去年4月盗用联合国安理会的名义,炮制“议长声明”对我们的和平卫星发射横加指责时,我们也保持了最大限度的克制。
    但是,美国一再粗暴侵犯我们的卫星发射权利,不仅对之未进行道歉,反而率先履行联合国安理会的“制裁决议”,逐步加大敌对力度。既然如此,我们的忍耐也达到了界限。
    此次核试验的主要目的在于,彰显我国军队和人民对美国强盗的敌对行为的冲天愤怒,显示先军朝鲜把国家主权捍卫到底的意志和能力。
    我们的核试验是不违背任何国际法、正大光明的的自卫措施。
    美国早就把朝鲜列入核先发制人打击的对象名单。
    以核遏制力对付美国变本加厉的核威胁,是极为应当的正当防卫措施。
    为了维护国家的最高利益,我们选择了经合法程序退出《不扩散核武器条约》、具备自卫核遏制力的道路。
    联合国的历史已达60多年,在全球范围共进行了2000多次核试验和9000多次卫星发射,但从未有过不允许进行核试验和卫星发射的安理会决议。
    进行了最多核试验和卫星发射的美国炮制出唯独朝鲜不该进行核试验和卫星发射的联合国安理会“决议”,就是对国际法的违反、双重标准的极致。
    要是联合国安理会具有一点点的公正,应该首先把美国对国际和平和安全构成威胁的核先发制人打击政策视为问题,而非主权国家的自卫权行使和和平的科技活动。
    此次核试验是我们最大限度保持克制的第一次应对措施。
    如果美国继续保持敌对立场,将局势复杂化,我们将不得不采取更高强度的第二、第三次应对连锁措施。
    敌对势力所叫嚷的检查船只或海上封锁,都将被认为是战争行为,引发我们对其本营无慈悲的报复打击。
    美国应做出抉择:要么哪怕是现在,尊重朝鲜的卫星发射权利,打开缓和与稳定的局面,要么将对朝敌视政策追求到底,继续走朝着形势爆发的当前错误道路。
    如果美国最终选择冲突之路,世界将清楚地看到我国军队和人民在正义与非正义之间的决一死战中如何将自己的尊严和主权捍卫到底,在统一祖国的革命大事变中如何赢得最后胜利。(完)
 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-13 00:05:24 | 显示全部楼层
海外同胞和外国嘉宾抵达平壤

朝中社平壤2月12日电 在金正日总书记诞辰日到来之际,以乌兹别克斯坦高统联(高丽人统一联合会)副主席高大春为团长的国际高统联代表团12日抵达平壤,开始对朝鲜进行访问。
同日,中国延边科技大学副校长崔龙浩、中国丹东盛民贸易有限公司董事长李永浩一行抵达平壤,出席第17届金正日花展。
参加第22届白头山奖国际花样滑冰节的俄罗斯、乌克兰、爱沙尼亚和加拿大选手当天抵达平壤。(完)
 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-13 00:05:59 | 显示全部楼层
这个国际花样滑冰节,俄罗斯和乌克兰都是原苏联国家,而爱沙尼亚和加拿大则是北约国家。。。有意思,有意思。。。
发表于 2013-2-13 17:40:22 | 显示全部楼层
这个国际花样滑冰节,俄罗斯和乌克兰都是原苏联国家,而爱沙尼亚和加拿大则是北约国家。。。有意思,有意思。。。
henanhujaa 发表于 2013-2-13 00:05

呵呵。朝鲜有这等吸引力,看来是帝国主义们和修正主义们是阻挡不了的。
 楼主| 发表于 2013-2-13 19:47:17 | 显示全部楼层
http://carnegieendowment.org/201 ... of-north-korea/ffry


Nuclear Defiance out of North Korea
James M. Acton Q&A February 12, 2013
Summary
An evaluation of North Korea¡¯s third nuclear test and its developing nuclear capability.

Following through on its threat, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test. In a Q&A, James M. Acton details what we know about the test and North Korea¡¯s developing nuclear capability.

What is the evidence that North Korea tested a nuclear weapon?

A significant earth tremor originating from the vicinity of North Korea¡¯s test site was detected across Asia on Tuesday. It was immediately clear from the seismic data that the cause was an explosion rather than an earthquake.

Although seismic signals cannot unambiguously distinguish between conventional and nuclear explosions, there is effectively no doubt that the explosion was nuclear. Satellite imagery would have revealed a North Korean attempt to assemble the required quantity of conventional explosives.

How big was the blast?

The United States Geological Survey initially reported the magnitude of the seismic motion as 4.9, but this was subsequently revised to 5.1. By comparison, North Korea¡¯s first two tests, conducted on October 9, 2006, and May 25, 2009, led to magnitude 4.3 and 4.7 events, respectively.

Unfortunately, because the depth of the test is not known and the geology of the test site is uncertain, translating the seismic magnitude into yield is difficult. The U.S. director of national intelligence stated that the yield was ¡°several kilotons,¡± which is equivalent to several thousand tons of TNT. The South Korean government placed it at 6¨C7 kilotons. My own back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests a yield of between 4 and 15 kilotons.

By way of comparison, the 2006 test had a yield of about 0.9 kilotons. There is much more uncertainty about the yield of the second test, but most estimates range from about 2 kilotons to 7 kilotons. Therefore, it is likely but not certain that the most recent test was the largest of the three.

Did Pyongyang test a miniaturized device?

There was extensive speculation before the test that Pyongyang would test a miniaturized device that could be fitted to a ballistic missile (most analysts believe North Korea¡¯s goal is to be able to threaten South Korea, Japan, and, in the longer run, the United States with nuclear missiles). Moreover, Pyongyang has stated that it tested a ¡°smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones,¡± implying that it did indeed test a miniaturized device.

That said, there is not yet any independent confirmation of Pyongyang¡¯s claims because neither the size nor the weight of a device can be extracted from seismic data. Moreover, in an interesting¡ªand distinctly North Korean¡ªtwist, a separate and apparently contradictory statement from Pyongyang implied that, even before the test, it had already developed a miniaturized warhead.

What else could it have been, apart from a miniaturized device?

A few weeks ago, North Korea announced its intention to conduct ¡°a nuclear test of higher level.¡± This statement was generally interpreted to mean that it was aiming for a higher yield than either of its first two tests. While it may have achieved this goal, it is possible that Pyongyang was aiming for a significantly higher yield¡ªon a par with early American weapons (15¨C20 kilotons) or perhaps even larger. If this was North Korea¡¯s goal, then the test should be considered a partial failure.

A second alternative (not mutually exclusive with the first) is that North Korea tested a highly enriched uranium design. North Korea¡¯s first test used plutonium. It is widely assumed that its second test also used plutonium, although this has not been definitively established. A third test, therefore, may have been intended to validate a design using highly enriched uranium.

A highly enriched uranium test would be a significant development. North Korea¡¯s plutonium stockpile is small and has been depleted somewhat by earlier tests. Given the dilapidated state of its plutonium-production infrastructure, it would be both difficult and expensive to produce more. If, however, North Korea has mastered uranium enrichment, it could expand its arsenal relatively cheaply and quickly.

Unfortunately, we don¡¯t yet have any evidence as to the device¡¯s design yield or whether it was made from plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

Is it possible North Korea tested a miniaturized uranium device?

Yes. It is technically harder to miniaturize a uranium device than a plutonium one. So, a test of a miniaturized uranium device would be particularly worrying. It would not only mean that Pyongyang had mastered uranium enrichment and developed (or was well on its way to developing) a warhead that could be mounted on a ballistic missile but also point to rapid improvement in North Korea¡¯s technical prowess.

Will more information become available?

If radioactive material from North Korea¡¯s test has leaked into the atmosphere, then it might be possible to learn more about the device. There are many air monitors capable of detecting minute amounts of radiation across the world (some of which are part of the monitoring system set up to verify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty). In advance of the test, many governments deployed additional such assets to the region.

If radioactivity is detected, it should be possible to distinguish between a uranium and a plutonium device. It may also be possible to assess what other materials were present in the device and hence make educated guesses about its design (but the government is unlikely to be forthcoming with this information).

Unfortunately, there is no guarantee of radioactive leakage or that any radioactive leakage that does occur will be detected. No material from North Korea¡¯s second test was detected, for instance. However, many U.S. and Russian tests leaked, even with those countries¡¯ considerable experience in underground tests. So don¡¯t assume that the 2013 test won¡¯t leak.
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