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维基揭秘 中国官方准备抛弃北韩,接受南韩统一全韩国”
(李良书简 二零一零年十一月二十九日之二)
当第一批【维基揭秘】出笼宣露美军在伊拉克的“暴行”时,我那时就认为这是一种障眼法,是为美国的政策服务的,因为所“泻”者多是老生常谈,众所周知而无甚新意,可作为公关的意味则甚浓,可能是美国“危机处理(Crisis Management,包括危机事前的设计, 事后的善后及利用) 的一种手法。
最近这次泄出的有关跟中国官方来往的言谈(英文稿见后附)及中朝之间的来往,是否也是跟第一次的用意一样,一石二鸟,一以离间中朝的战略伙伴关系,二以分化中国领导班子的决策,是为美国方今在东亚的行动服务?
无论如何,其中显露出有关中国方面的败笔,则是令人发指!而朝鲜最近的炮击跟高调记念中朝六十年前的并肩作战跟表扬毛岸英,也是不为无因的了。
总结起来,这次泄出的要义如下:
一.中国接受南韩(即韩国)统一北韩(即朝鲜)并有意疏远朝鲜,认为朝鲜是个“宠坏了的孩子”。
二.北京方面於朝鲜去年进行的飞弹跟核试验甚为恼怒,因为这会影响经济发展的稳定性。
三.关於以上的一,二两点尤其是第一点,今日国务卿希拉里公开斥责【维基揭秘】网站的行为”是对美国和国际社会的攻击,严重损害了国际间的互信,但美国会继续积极外交政策,协助解决全球纷争。“云云。希拉里的说话也是一种公关,”其词若有憾焉而实甚喜之“,在给风雨飘摇中的中朝关系火上加油。
这有关中朝关系的泄露详情是:
A。南韩副总理指名道姓的说有两名中国高级官员建议南韩应该统一北韩,这两名官员并说这个方针已为北京的领导阶层广为接受( gaining ground with the leadership in Beijing)。
B。中国的副外交部长何亚飞告知美方谓平壤2009年四月试验飞弹的行径像个“宠坏了的孩子”。
C。一个中国大使警告说朝鲜的核试是对世界安全的威胁。
D。一个中国官员说中国将面临朝鲜难民三十万的进入,必要时要用军队来封锁中朝边境。
E。今年二月,当时的南韩副外交部长 Chun Yung-woo 告诉一美国大使 Kathleen Stephens谓现时的中国共产党领导人物已不再认为朝鲜是个有用跟可靠的盟友,所以不会再以军事援助朝鲜。 Chun Yung-woo 后来升为南韩总统李明博的”国家安全顾问“,
还说朝鲜的经济早已垮掉,而待金正日死后朝鲜政治上也会烟消云散。
F。 Kathleen Stephens 说,Chun Yung-woo 引用前述的两名高级中国官员的话, 谓南韩如统一韩国,中国将会满意於一个由南韩统一的韩国并成为美国的附庸国,因为这可大大地( Tremendous)增加中国公司的贸易和劳务输出。 Chun Yung-woo 完全肯定中国将不会再次介入朝鲜事务,因为中国认为她的经济利益是在美国,日本,和南韩的一边,而非朝鲜。
G。2009年九月朝鲜飞弹试射之后,中国副外交部长何亚飞在北京美国大史馆告诉美方说北韩要单独跟美国周旋,像个”宠坏了的小孩“。
H。去年九月,何亚飞告诉美国国务次卿 James Steinberg 说”我们(中国) ”并不喜欢朝鲜作为一个邻居!“,并说温家宝总理将促使朝鲜去核化跟重启六方会谈。何并向美方抱怨说”朝鲜想尽办法让中国敌对美国。。。“
I。2009年6月,中国驻卡萨斯旦大使 Cheng Guoping 告诉美国驻卡萨斯旦大使谓
” 十分关心朝鲜的核试,我们必需解决这个对世界安全有威胁的问题!” 。
J。一个中国驻国际机构的代表说“中国准备接受三十万朝鲜难民并以军事封锁中朝边境并呼吁他国来胁助。
李良写译至此,不自禁全身冒出冷汗,如果所言均是属实,中国的外交部甘脆改为美国国务院下的中国部好了!
可悲可叹的是,当年一场战争,中国已失南方屏障越南,中国的北方干城朝鲜,也将被”经济发展”四字卖出。如此一来,中国既无盟友,也无战略纵深,13亿中国人,将来如何的活下去?
。。。。。。。。。。。。。
【维基揭秘】中国官方表示过准备抛弃北韩,接受南韩主导南北统一
The US embassy cables
Wikileaks cables reveal China 'ready to abandon North Korea'
Leaked dispatches show Beijing is frustrated with military actions of 'spoiled child' and increasingly favours reunified Korea
* Simon Tisdall
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guardian.co.uk, Monday 29 November 2010 21.30 GMT
Article history
China has signalled its readiness to accept Korean reunification and is privately distancing itself from the North Korean regime, according to leaked US embassy cables that reveal senior Beijing figures regard their official ally as a "spoiled child".
News of the Chinese shift comes at a crucial juncture after the North's artillery bombardment of a South Korean island last week that killed four people and led both sides to threaten war. China has refused to condemn the North Korean action. But today Beijing appeared to bow to US pressure to help bring about a diplomatic solution, calling for "emergency consultations" and inviting a senior North Korean official to Beijing.
China is sharply critical of US pressure tactics towards North Korea and wants a resumption of the six-party nuclear disarmament talks. But the Guardian can reveal Beijing's frustration with Pyongyang has grown since its missile and nuclear tests last year, worries about the economic impact of regional instability, and fears that the death of the dictator, Kim Jong-il, could spark a succession struggle.
China's moves to distance itself from Kim are revealed in the latest tranche of leaked US embassy cables published by the Guardian and four international newspapers. Tonight, the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, said the US "deeply regrets" the release of the material by WikiLeaks. They were an "attack on the international community", she said. "It puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security and undermines efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems," she told reporters at the state department.
The leaked North Korea dispatches detail how:
• South Korea's vice-foreign minister said he was told by two named senior Chinese officials that they believed Korea should be reunified under Seoul's control, and that this view was gaining ground with the leadership in Beijing.
• China's vice-foreign minister told US officials that Pyongyang was behaving like a "spoiled child" to get Washington's attention in April 2009 by carrying out missile tests.
• A Chinese ambassador warned that North Korean nuclear activity was "a threat to the whole world's security".
• Chinese officials assessed that it could cope with an influx of 300,000 North Koreans in the event of serious instability, according to a representative of an international agency, but might need to use the military to seal the border.
In highly sensitive discussions in February this year, the-then South Korean vice-foreign minister, Chun Yung-woo, told a US ambassador, Kathleen Stephens, that younger generation Chinese Communist party leaders no longer regarded North Korea as a useful or reliable ally and would not risk renewed armed conflict on the peninsula, according to a secret cable to Washington.
Chun, who has since been appointed national security adviser to South Korea's president, said North Korea had already collapsed economically.
Political collapse would ensue once Kim Jong-il died, despite the dictator's efforts to obtain Chinese help and to secure the succession for his son, Kim Jong-un.
"Citing private conversations during previous sessions of the six-party talks , Chun claimed [the two high-level officials] believed Korea should be unified under ROK [South Korea] control," Stephens reported.
"The two officials, Chun said, were ready to 'face the new reality' that the DPRK [North Korea] now had little value to China as a buffer state – a view that, since North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006, had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC [People's Republic of China] leaders. Chun argued that in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly 'not welcome' any US military presence north of the DMZ [demilitarised zone]. Again citing his conversations with [the officials], Chun said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the US in a 'benign alliance' – as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labour-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help 'salve' PRC concerns about … a reunified Korea.
"Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan and South Korea – not North Korea."
Chun told Stephens China was unable to persuade Pyongyang to change its self-defeating policies – Beijing had "much less influence than most people believe" – and lacked the will to enforce its views.
A senior Chinese official, speaking off the record, also said China's influence with the North was frequently overestimated. But Chinese public opinion was increasingly critical of the North's behaviour, the official said, and that was reflected in changed government thinking.
Previously hidden tensions between Pyongyang and its only ally were also exposed by China's then vice-foreign minister in a meeting in April 2009 with a US embassy official after North Korea blasted a three-stage rocket over Japan into the Pacific. Pyongyang said its purpose was to send a satellite into orbit but the US, South Korea and Japan saw the launch as a test of long-range missile technology.
Discussing how to tackle the issue with the charge d'affaires at the Beijing embassy, He Yafei observed that "North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a 'spoiled child' in order to get the attention of the 'adult'. China encouraged the United States, 'after some time', to start to re-engage the DPRK," according to the diplomatic cable sent to Washington.
A second dispatch from September last year described He downplaying the Chinese premier's trip to Pyongyang, telling the US deputy secretary of state, James Steinberg: "We may not like them ... [but] they [the DPRK] are a neighbour."
He said the premier, Wen Jiabao, would push for denuclearisation and a return to the six-party talks. The official also complained that North Korea "often tried to play China off [against] the United States, refusing to convey information about US-DPRK bilateral conversations".
Further evidence of China's increasing dismay with Pyongyang comes in a cable in June 2009 from the US ambassador to Kazakhstan, Richard Hoagland. He reported that his Chinese counterpart, Cheng Guoping. was "genuinely concerned by North Korea's recent nuclear missile tests. 'We need to solve this problem. It is very troublesome,' he said, calling Korea's nuclear activity a 'threat to the whole world's security'."
Cheng said Beijing "hopes for peaceful reunification in the long term, but he expects the two countries to remain separate in the short term", Hoagland reported. China's objectives were "to ensure they [North Korean leaders] honour their commitments on non-proliferation, maintain stability, and 'don't drive [Kim Jong-il] mad'."
While some Chinese officials are reported to have dismissed suggestions that North Korea would implode after Kim's death, another cable offers evidence that Beijing has considered the risk of instability.
It quoted a representative from an international agency saying Chinese officials believed they could absorb 300,000 North Koreans without outside help. If they arrived "all at once" it might use the military to seal the border, create a holding area and meet humanitarian needs. It might also ask other countries for help.
The context of the discussions was not made explicit, although an influx of that scale would only be likely in the event of regime failure. The representative said he was not aware of any contingency planning to deal with large numbers of refugees.
A Seoul embassy cable from January 2009 said China's leader, Hu Jintao, deliberately ducked the issue when the South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, raised it at a summit.
"We understand Lee asked Hu what China thought about the North Korean domestic political situation and whether Beijing had any contingency plans. This time, Hu apparently pretended not to hear Lee," it said. The cable does not indicate the source of the reports, although elsewhere it talks about contacts at the presidential "blue house" in South Korea. |
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